Sophist by Plato. - HTML preview

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Sophist – Plato

THEAETETUS: What is it?

THEAETETUS: There is.

STRANGER: The nature of the other appears to STRANGER: Shall we say that this has or has me to be divided into fractions like knowledge.

not a name?

THEAETETUS: How so?

THEAETETUS: It has; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the beautiful, not than STRANGER: Knowledge, like the other, is one; something else.

and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence STRANGER: And now tell me another thing.

there are many arts and kinds of knowledge.

THEAETETUS: What?

THEAETETUS: Quite true.

STRANGER: Is the not-beautiful anything but STRANGER: And is not the case the same with this—an existence parted off from a certain kind the parts of the other, which is also one?

of existence, and again from another point of view opposed to an existing something?

THEAETETUS: Very likely; but will you tell me how?

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

STRANGER: Then the not-beautiful turns out to 151

Sophist – Plato

be the opposition of being to being?

STRANGER: The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a THEAETETUS: Very true.

real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist.

STRANGER: But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real ex-THEAETETUS: Of course.

istence?

STRANGER: Then, as would appear, the opposi-THEAETETUS: Not at all.

tion of a part of the other, and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, as STRANGER: And the not-great may be said to truly essence as being itself, and implies not the exist, equally with the great?

opposite of being, but only what is other than being.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Beyond question.

STRANGER: And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just—

STRANGER: What then shall we call it?

the one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other.

THEAETETUS: Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us THEAETETUS: True.

to search.